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Abstract
Unlawful collusion is when rms have a mutual understanding to coordinate their
behavior for the purpose of achieving a supracompetitive outcome. Given the legal
focus on mutual beliefs, this paper initiates a research program to explore how much and
what type of mutual beliefs among rms allows them to e¤ectively collude. Focusing on
price leadership as the collusive mechanism, it is assumed that rms commonly believe
that price increases will be at least matched but lack any shared understanding about
who will lead, when they will, and at what prices. Su¢ cient conditions are derived
which ensure that supracompetitive prices emerge. However, an upper bound on price
is derived which is less than the maximal equilibrium price.
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1 Introduction
Collusion is when rms coordinate their behavior to suppress competition through such
activities as raising prices, allocating markets, and bid rigging. In the U.S., unlawful collusion
has come to mean that rms have an agreement to coordinate their behavior. In their
interpretation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, courts view an agreement as present when
there is "mutual consent" among rms,1 when rms have "a conscious commitment to a
common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective,"2 and when rms have a "unity of
purpose or a common design and understanding, or a meeting of minds."3 This perspective is
not unique to the U.S. Article 101 of the Treaty of the European Communities (1999) declares
agreements to be unlawful that "have as their object or e¤ect the prevention, restriction or
distortion of competition" and the European Union General Court denes an agreement as
when rms have "joint intention" (ACF Chemiefarma, 1970) and a "concurrence of wills"
(Bayer v. Commission, 2000). In sum, rms unlawfully collude when there is a mutual
understanding to coordinate their behavior for the purpose of achieving a supracompetitive
outcome.4
As a "meeting of minds" or "concurrence of wills" is not something that is directly ob-
served, evidentiary standards for determining liability are based on communications that
could produce mutual understanding and market behavior that is the possible consequence
of mutual understanding. Some communication practices - such as rms expressly commu-
nicating a plan to coordinate prices or allocate markets - are subject to a per se prohibition.
But then there are communication practices which are insu¢ cient by themselves to estab-
lish liability but could deliver a guilty verdict when buttressed with corroborating market
evidence that the communication was successful in generating the requisite mutual under-
standing. For example, there are cases in which a single rm made an announcement that
was public to all rms and thereby could serve to coordinate behavior. In Interstate Circuit,
Inc. v. United States (1939), one rm sent a letter to each of the other rms that stated a
plan to coordinate on price and made clear in the letter that every rm was receiving the
same letter. In United States v. Foley (1980), there was a dinner among realtors during
which one of them announced he was raising his commission rate from six to seven percent.
In both of these cases, even though there was no exchange of assurances, rms were able to
successfully coordinate their behavior using indirect communication.
The primary legal challenge is determining when rms share an understanding to raise
prices, allocate markets, or engage in some other form of coordinated behavior. In dening
the boundaries of unlawful collusion, this challenge can be broken down to addressing two
questions. First, what is the relationship between communications among rms and the level
of mutual understanding that is achieved? What communication practices are e¤ective in
producing mutual beliefs among rms and with regards to what aspects of behavior is there
mutual understanding? Second, what is the relationship between mutual understanding
among rms and their market behavior? What types of mutual beliefs result in coordination
1Esco Corp. v. United States, 340 F.2d 1000, 1007-08 (9th Cir. 1965).
2Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984); 753.
3American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); 810.
4For a critical examination of U.S. law with respect to price-xing, the reader is referred to Kaplow
(2013).
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on prices and, more generally, supracompetitive outcomes?
The objective of this paper is to address the second question: How much and what type of
mutual understanding results in collusive outcomes? On this question, the economic theory
of collusion shows that if rms have mutual beliefs regarding a collusive strategy prole - that
is, each rm has correct beliefs of this strategy prole - and incentive compatibility conditions
hold (that is, the collusive strategy prole is an equilibrium) then supracompetitive outcomes
will emerge. If rms were to expressly communicate with each other - as is done in hard core
cartels (for examples, see Harrington 2006 and Marshall and Marx 2012) - it is reasonable to
suppose that they could achieve mutual beliefs regarding the strategy prole. For example,
managers could meet and express the intent to raise prices by 10% and to persist in doing
so only if every rm charges 10% higher prices. If there are mutual beliefs regarding such
a strategy and it is optimal for each rm to use that strategy, economic theory predicts
supracompetitive outcomes will result.
While it may be reasonable to expect rms, who have engaged in direct and uncon-
strained communication, to have mutual beliefs regarding the collusive strategy prole, there
are many episodes of collusion for which communication is limited and, as a consequence,
mutual understanding may be incomplete. Firms have attempted to coordinate their be-
havior through a wide variety of communication practices including tacking on a few digits
to a multi-million dollar bid (FCC spectrum auctions; see Cramton and Schwartz, 2000),
committing to a policy of non-negotiable posted prices (turbine generators; see Harrington,
2011), announcing future intended prices (airlines; see Borenstein, 2004), and unilaterally
announcing a collusive pricing strategy (free-standing newspaper inserts; see In the Matter
of Valassis Communications, Inc., Federal Trade Commission, File No. 051 0008, Docket
No. C-4160, April 28, 2006). Presumably, the reason that rms chose not to expressly com-
municate is because the more direct the method of communication, the greater the chances
of detection, prosecution, and conviction. Thus, in an environment for which collusion is
unlawful, rms will have an incentive to engage in indirect forms of communication which
is then likely to limit the amount of shared understanding. This then leads us back to our
central research question: How much and what kind of mutual understanding is enough for
rms to e¤ectively collude?5
Epistemic game theory provides a natural approach for exploring the relationship between
rmsmutual beliefs and their behavior. Rather than specify a game and an equilibrium
concept - which implicitly assumes rms have mutual beliefs with regards to a strategy
prole - an epistemic approach begins with playersknowledge and beliefs about the game,
about playersrationality, and about other playersbeliefs. Typically, epistemic game theory
places no prior structure on playersbeliefs regarding other playersstrategies and instead
derives those beliefs; while equilibrium game theory assumes mutual beliefs with regards to a
particular strategy prole and characterizes those strategy proles consistent with rationality.
The approach that is being proposed here lies between these two extremes in that it assumes
5Even with express communication, mutual understanding regarding the strategy prole is not inevitable.
For example, given rm asymmetries, there could be disagreement regarding the strategy prole and a
breakdown in bargaining could occur prior to achieving mutual beliefs as to the strategy prole. Such was
the case in the lysine cartel (Connor, 2001). While rms agreed to a price, they initially failed to agree to a
market allocation with respect to sales quotas. While prices rose, they quickly fell. Firms then returned to
bargaining, settled on a market allocation, and e¤ective collusion ensued.
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some mutual beliefs on the strategies of other players - as might be achieved through limited
forms of communication - but these mutual beliefs fall short of rms having common beliefs
regarding the entire strategy prole.
The research program is to specify mutual beliefs regarding the game, rmsrationality,
and rmsstrategies and to then derive the implications for rm behavior with a particu-
lar focus on understanding when supracompetitive outcomes will emerge. Crucial to this
approach is making relevant and plausible assumptions regarding mutual beliefs on rms
strategies. Relevance means it is relevant to rms coordinating their behavior, and plausible
means rms could plausibly obtain these mutual beliefs without engaging in express commu-
nication. In some instances, it could be reasonable for rms to share mutual beliefs regarding
the collusive mechanism but not about the particular details associated with implementing
that mechanism. For example, rms could mutually believe that they will engage in price
leadership but lack mutual beliefs regarding the sequence of price increases and who will
lead; or rms could share an understanding to allocate a market in terms of exclusive terri-
tories but do not have mutual beliefs as to the assignment of territories; or rms could have
mutual understanding to engage in bid rotation at procurement auctions but lack a shared
understanding regarding which rm is slated to win which auction. Whatever the case, it is
important to motivate the mutual beliefs that are assumed.
In this paper, the focus is on price leadership which is one of the most common methods
of collusion not deploying express communication.6 Price leadership involves a rm raising
price and other rms matching that price increase, with potentially multiple episodes of a
rm leading and other rms following. It could have the same rm lead or rms could take
turns. It could have many or few price increases; price increases could be large or small.
The full strategy encompasses the timing of price increases, the size of price increases, and
the identities of the rms leading the price increase. If rms do not engage in express
communication, it is di¢ cult to imagine that they could achieve mutual beliefs with respect
to such details. However, suppose instead that their mutual beliefs only pertain to the
property of price leadership that a price increase will be at least matched by the other rms,
and failure to do so means a return to competitive prices. This level of mutual understanding
could possibly be achieved through public announcements such as rms announcing that they
will not undercut rival rmsprices. In that case, a rm conveys its intent to avoid aggressive
competition but its announcement falls far short of expressing a plan to coordinate prices.
For example, U-Haul CEO Joe Schoen conveyed during an earnings conference call with
analysts that it thought rival Budgets price undercutting in the truck rental market was
nonsensical and proposed moving to price leadership. While such an announcement fell short
of evidentiary standards for Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the Federal Trade Commission
pursued a Section 5 case (under the Federal Trade Commission Act) against U-Haul as an
"invitation to collude".7
In this paper, it is assumed that the game and rmsrationality are common knowledge
and that there is common knowledge regarding the following properties of rmsstrategies:
price increases will be at least matched and failure to do so results in non-collusive (static
Nash equilibrium) prices. Two questions are addressed. First, are these mutual beliefs
6For some examples, see Markham (1951) and Scherer (1980, Chapter 6).
7Matter of U-Haul Intl Inc. and AMERCO (FTC File No. 081-0157, July 10, 2010)
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su¢ cient to result in supracompetitive prices? Second, if they can achieve supracompetitive
prices, are those prices less than what would be achieved if there was mutual understanding
of the entire strategy prole (that is, equilibrium)? To my knowledge, this is the rst paper
to investigate when less than full mutual understanding of a collusive strategy prole is
su¢ cient to generate e¤ective collusion.
There are two main results. The rst nding is that if it is common knowledge that price
increases will be at least matched (and failure to do so will result in competitive prices)
then an upper bound on price is derived that is strictly less than the maximal price achieved
under equilibrium (using the same implicit punishment). Thus, in this particular setting,
less than full mutual understanding of the strategy prole does limit the extent of collusion.
The reason is that without mutual beliefs regarding the collusive price, coordinating on a
higher collusive price requires some rm to take the lead in raising price and this is a costly
enterprise which limits the extent of price increases. While an upper bound on price is
derived, no more can be said about price paths induced by this set of mutual beliefs; it could
involve competitive or supracompetitive prices. Thus, in answer to the rst question, mutual
beliefs that price increases will be at least matched does not imply supracompetitive prices.
With only mutual beliefs that price increases will be at least matched, a rm can assign
positive probability to many strategies for the other rms. For example, a rm could believe
that another rm will always act as a price leader or instead that other rms believe itll
be the price leader or that another rm will initiate the price increase process and, only
upon doing so, will other rms subsequently lead on price. In deriving the rst result, no
structure was placed on how rms update their beliefs over other rmsstrategies as the
history unfolds. If it is further assumed that rms engage in Bayesian updating and that
prior beliefs assign positive probability to the true price path then it can be shown that rms
will eventually succeed in coordinating on supracompetitive prices. Thus, supracompetitive
prices are sure to emerge even though rms lack common knowledge about who will lead on
price, when they will lead, and what prices they will charge. That is the second main nding
of the paper.
The model is described in Section 2 - where standard assumptions are made regarding
cost, demand, and rm objectives - and in Section 3 - where, consistent with the epistemic
approach, assumptions are made regarding the behavior and beliefs of rms. An upper
bound on price is characterized in Section 4. The implications of having rms learn about
other rmsstrategies is explored in Section 5. Section 6 o¤ers a few concluding remarks.
Proofs are in Appendix A.
2 Assumptions on the Market
Consider a symmetric di¤erentiated products price game with n rms.  (pi;p i) : <n+ ! <
is a rm is prot when it prices at pi and its rivals price at p i = (p1; :::; pi 1; pi+1; :::; pn) :
Assume  (pi;p i) is bounded, twice continuously di¤erentiable, increasing in a rivals price
pj (j 6= i), and strictly concave in own price pi: A rms best reply function then exists:
 (p i) = arg max
pi
 (pi;p i) :
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Further assume
@2
@pi@pj
> 0; 8j 6= i
from which it follows that  (p i) is increasing in pj; j 6= i. A symmetric Nash equilibrium
price, pN ; exists and is assumed to be unique,8
 (p; ::; p) T p as p S pN ;
and let
N    pN ; :::; pN > 0:
Assuming  (p; :::; p) is strictly concave in p; there exists a unique joint prot maximum
pM ;
nX
j=1
@ (p; :::; p)
@pj
T 0 as p S pM ;
and pM > pN :
Firms interact in an innitely repeated price game with perfect monitoring. A collusive
price p0 > pN is sustainable with the grim trigger strategy if and only if:9
1
1  

 (p0; :::; p0)  max
pi
 (pi; p
0; :::; p0) +


1  

N ; (1)
where  is the common discount factor. Dene ep as the best price sustainable using the grim
trigger strategy:
ep  maxp 2 pN ; pM :  1
1  

 (p; :::; p)  max
pi<p
 (pi; p; :::; p) +


1  

N

:
Assume ep > pN and if ep 2  pN ; pM then
1
1  

 (p; :::; p) T  ( (p; :::; p) ; p; :::; p) +


1  

N as p S ep for p 2 pN ; pM : (2)
ep will prove to be a useful benchmark.
For the later analysis, consider the "price matching" objective function for a rm:
W (pi;p i)   (pi;p i) +


1  

 (pi; :::; pi) :
Given its rivals price at p i in the current period, W (pi;p i) is rm is payo¤ from pricing
at pi if it believed that all rms would match that price in all ensuing periods. Consider
@W (pi;p i)
@pi
=
@ (pi;p i)
@pi
+


1  
 nX
j=1
@ (pi; :::; pi)
@pj
:
8A su¢ cient condition is
@2
@p2i
+
X
j 6=i
@2
@pi@pj
< 0; 8 (pi;p i) :
9The grim trigger strategy has any deviation from the collusive price p0 result in a price of pN forever.
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If pi < pM then the second term is positive; by raising its current price, a rm increases
the future prot stream under the assumption that its price increase will be matched by its
rivals. If pi >  (p i) then the rst term is negative. Evaluate
@W (pi;p i)
@pi
when rms price at
a common level p:
@W (p; :::; p)
@pi
=
@ (p; :::; p)
@pi
+


1  
 nX
j=1
@ (p; :::; p)
@pj
=

1
1  
 
@ (p; :::; p)
@pi
+ 
nX
j 6=i
@ (p; :::; p)
@pj
!
Thus, when p 2  pN ; pM ; raising price lowers current prot, @(p;:::;p)
@pi
< 0; and increases fu-
ture prot,
Pn
j=1
@(p;:::;p)
@pj
> 0. By the preceding assumptions, W (pi;p i) is strictly concave
in pi since it is the weighted sum of two strictly concave functions. Hence, a unique optimal
price exists,
 (p i) = arg max
pi
W (pi;p i) : (3)
By the preceding assumptions,  (p i) is increasing in a rivals price as
@ (p i)
@pj
=  @
2W (pi;p i) =@pi@pj
@2W (pi;p i) =@p2i
=  
@2(pi;p i)
@pi@pj
@2(pi;p i)
@p2i
+
 

1 
 @2(p;:::;p)
@p2
 > 0:
As there is a benet in terms of future prot from raising price (as long as it does not exceed
the joint prot maximum) then the price matching best reply function results in a higher
price than the standard best reply function. To show this result, consider
@W ( (p i) ;p i)
@pi
=
@ ( (p i) ;p i)
@pi
+


1  
 nX
j=1
@ ( (p i) ; :::;  (p i))
@pj
=


1  
 nX
j=1
@ ( (p i) ; :::;  (p i))
@pj
> 0;
which is positive because p i 
 
pM ; :::; pM

implies  (p i) < pM .10 By the strict concavity
of W ,  (p i) >  (p i) :
 has a xed point p because it is continuous, 
 
pN ; :::; pN

> pN ; and
@W
 
pM ; :::; pM

@pi
=
@
 
pM ; :::; pM

@pi
< 0)   pM ; :::; pM < pM :
Further assume the xed point is unique:
 (p; :::; p) T p as p S p:
10Since  (p; ::; p) T p as p S pN then  
 
pM ; ::; pM

< pM : Given that  is increasing then p i  
pM ; :::; pM

implies  (p i) <  
 
pM ; ::; pM

< pM :
7
Thus, if rival rms price at p, a rm prefers to price at p rather than price di¤erently
under the assumption that its price will be matched forever. p will prove to be a useful
benchmark.
Results are proven when the price set is nite.11 From hereon, assume the price set is

  f0; "; 2"; :::; Pg ; where P is some upper bound on price and " > 0 and is presumed
to be small. For convenience, suppose pN ; p; ep 2 
.12 As the niteness of the price set
could generate multiple optima, dene the best reply correspondence for the price matching
objective function:
 (p i)  arg max
pi2

 (pi;p i) +


1  

 (pi; :::; pi) :
The best reply correspondence is assumed to have the following property:13
 (p i)
8<:
 fp0 + "; :::; pg if p i = (p0; :::; p0) where p0 < p   "
= fpg if p i = (p; :::; p)
 fp; :::; p0   "g if p i = (p0; :::; p0) where p0 > p + "
(4)
Recall that p is the unique xed point for  (p i); it is also a xed point for  (p i).
By (4), if all rival rms price at p0 then rm is best reply has it price above p0 when
p0 < p   ": Analogously, if p0 > p + " then rm is best reply has it price below p0. Note
that an implication of (4) is that the set of symmetric xed points of  (p i) is, at most,
fp   "; p; p + "g.14
3 Assumptions on Beliefs and Behavior
Let us now turn to specifying rmsmutual beliefs regarding the game, rationality, and
strategies. The game is assumed to be common knowledge. Regarding rationality, I will use
extensive-form rationalizability and, in doing so, draw on some of the structure in Battigalli
and Siniscalchi (2003).15 For this purpose, dene the following terms. H  f?g[([t1
nt)
is the space of histories for the innitely repeated price game with perfect monitoring. si :
H !
 is a strategy for rm i and S denotes a rms strategy set, which is common to
all rms. i (s i jh) : H ! (Sn 1) is rm is beliefs on the strategies of the other rms
conditional on the history h 2 H where  (X) is the set of probability distributions on set
X.
Starting from the current period based on history h, let Ui (si; i ( jh)) be the expected
present value of prots for rm i after history h given rm is strategy is si and rm is
11A discussion of the case of an innite price set is provided at the end of Section 4.
12If ep 2 
 and  (ep; :::; ep) 2 
 then ep is still the best price sustainable using the grim punishment.
13A su¢ cient condition for (4) is  @2
@p2i
 2 @2@pi@p i , which holds when demand and cost functions are
linear.
14The case of linear demand and cost functions satises all of the assumptions made in Section 2. A proof
is available on request.
15While their framework allows a players private information (or type) to be both a trait (such as cost
in our setting) and beliefs on other playerstypes, here we consider the special case in which traits are not
private information.
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beliefs on the other rmsstrategies are i ( jh) : Given beliefs as to other rmsstrategies,
a rms strategy is sequentially rational if it is optimal for all histories.
Denition: bsi is sequentially rational with respect to beliefs i if, 8h 2 H, Ui (bsi; i ( jh)) 
Ui (si; 
i ( jh)) 8si 2 S:
Critical to our approach is allowing rms to have a reasonable amount of mutual under-
standing with respect to the strategy prole. As is laid out in the ensuing assumptions, the
presumption is that rms believe that a higher price (up to some maximum level) will be at
least matched and that any deviation - such as undercutting a rival rms price - will result
in a return to competitive pricing. This description of behavior is more formally stated as
the price matching plus (PMP) property.
Denition: The strategy of rm i has the price matching plus (PMP) property if, for some
p,
pti
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
2 maxpt 11 ; :::; pt 1n 	 ; :::; p	 if pj  minmaxp 11 ; :::; p 1n 	 ; p	 8j;8  t  1
and max

pt 11 ; :::; p
t 1
n
	
< p
= p if pj  min

max

p 11 ; :::; p
 1
n
	
; p
	 8j;8  t  1
and max

pt 11 ; :::; p
t 1
n
	  p
= pN if not pj  min

max

p 11 ; :::; p
 1
n
	
; p
	
8j;8  t  1
First note that matching a price increase means setting pti = max

pt 11 ; :::; p
t 1
n
	
: Thus, as of
period t, price increases have always been at least matched when pj  max

p 11 ; :::; p
 1
n
	 8j;
8  t   1. Price matching plus behavior is subject to the caveat that rms are only ex-
pected to match price as high as p; thus, rms are not expected to follow an excessively high
price increase. Firms have then been complying with this modied price matching when
pj  min

max

p 11 ; :::; p
 1
n
	
; p
	 8j; 8  t   1. In that event, the PMP property has a
rm price in period t at least as high as max

pt 11 ; :::; p
t 1
n
	
with the caveat of not pricing in
excess of p: Finally, if any rm should fail to act in a manner consistent with the previously
described behavior then rms revert to pricing at the non-collusive price pN thereafter.16
A strategy satisfying the PMP property is referred to as PMP-compatible, and dene
SPMP  S as the set of PMP-compatible strategies. The key belief restriction is that there
is mutual understanding among rms that they are using PMP-compatible strategies. With
rst level beliefs, this means that each rms beliefs regarding other rmsstrategies have
support SPMP or, as dened next, beliefs are PMP-consistent.
Denition: i are PMP-consistent if i : H !
 
SPMP
n 1
:
16The potential role of price matching here is to coordinate on a collusive outcome. Price matching has
also been explored as a form of punishment; see Lu and Wright (2010) and Garrod (2012). Some papers
exploring price leadership as a collusive equilibrium include Rotemberg and Saloner (1990) and Mouraviev
and Rey (2011).
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In dening what we mean by mutual understanding, we use the concept of mutual strong
beliefs from Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003). A rm has strong beliefs regarding some event
if it is certain about that event and that certainty is maintained as long as the history is
consistent with it.
Denition: A rm strongly believes event E if it is initially certain of E and would also be
certain of E conditional on every history whose occurrence does not contradict E.
Denition: All rms have a mutual strong belief in E if each rm strongly believes E.
As specied as Assumption A1, the behavioral assumption is that rms are sequentially
rational, and the belief assumption is that there is an innite hierarchy of mutual strong
beliefs that rms are sequentially rational and use strategies that have the PMP-property.
Note that it is not assumed that rms use a PMP-compatible strategy; that will be an
implication of sequential rationality and these beliefs.
Assumption A1: Assume \q0Aq where
A0 : Every rm is sequentially rational and has beliefs that are PMP-consistent.
A1 : There is mutual strong belief in A0.
A2 : There is mutual strong belief in A0 \ A1.
...
Am+1 : There is mutual strong belief in A0 \    \ Am.
...
One implication of A1 is that there is common knowledge among rms that: 1) price
increases are at least matched as long as past price increases have been at least matched in
the past; 2) price increases will be followed only as high as p; and 3) departure from this
price matching behavior results in reversion to non-collusive pricing. Let me discuss these
features.
Consider the assumption that it is common knowledge that failure to at least match price
increases (up to a maximum price of p) results in non-collusive pricing thereafter. It is useful
to break this assumption into two parts: 1) a departure from price matching results in some
form of punishment; and 2) that punishment is the grim punishment. The second condition is
unimportant because results are unchanged if the punishment is at least as severe as the grim
punishment. The rst condition seems natural in that rms are seeking to collude through
the mutual understanding that price increases will be at least matched. Thus, departure
from that behavior ought to induce either a breakdown of collusion or a more calculated
punishment. The restrictiveness of the condition is really that it is common knowledge as to
the low continuation payo¤ that ensues after a departure from price-matching plus behavior.
Though any punishment would work for our analysis, a coordinated punishment - as opposed
to simply a breakdown of collusion and a return to competition - would have to be justied
in terms of how the punishment is common knowledge without express communication. I feel
it is more consistent with the spirit of the enterprise to simply assume a departure results
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in a breakdown of collusion rather than a coordinated punishment, even though results are
not dependent on that specication.17
The next feature of the PMP property to consider is that a rm does not price in excess
of p; which means that it will follow price increases only as high as p and, as a price leader,
will not raise price beyond p. It is surely compelling for a rm to have some upper bound
to how high it will price; for example, it would be nonsensical to follow a price increase
to the point that market demand is zero or even to where it is above the monopoly price.
However, this assumption goes further in that the upper bound is common to rms, and is
commonly known. While strong, I believe it is necessary for the ensuing results. As shown
in Lemma 1, A1 implies that this upper bound on price matching cannot be less than the
static Nash equilibrium price and cannot exceed the highest equilibrium price (with the grim
punishment).
Lemma 1 A1 implies p 2 pN ; :::; ep	 :
The results of Section 4 require no further restriction on p, while the results of Section 5
are unchanged as long as p is not too much less than ep.18 However, itll make for an easier
presentation if it is assumed that the upper bound on price matching is the highest level
consistent with A1.
Assumption A2: p = ep:
One could imagine that ep might be focal given that it is the highest feasible value of p and
that higher values are more protable for all rms. From hereon, SPMP will refer to when
p = ep.
Consistent with the focus on the dynamic process by which rms come to coordinate
on supracompetitive prices, it is assumed that they start out with prices at competitive
levels: (p01; :::; p
0
n) =
 
pN ; :::; pN

. While it is a natural assumption, it is not necessary
for the ensuing results. Lemma 2 only requires max fp01; :::; p0ng 2

pN ; :::; ep	 ; while the
main results (Theorems 3 and 5) only require that the initial price vector is not too high:
(p01; :::; p
0
n) 2

pN ; :::; p + "
	n
:
Before moving on, it is useful to ask why it isnt reasonable to assume there are mutual
beliefs that rms use some typical punishment strategy and price immediately at ep: So, let us
consider rm i using a grim trigger strategy: i) price at pN in periods 1; :::; ti  1; ii) price atep in period ti; ii) price at ep in period t (> ti) if all rms priced at ep in periods t = ti; :::; t  1;
and iv) price at pN in period t (> ti) otherwise. Even if one could plausibly argue how rms
would achieve mutual beliefs regarding this strategy, collusive prices will emerge if and only
if t1 =    = tn so that there is mutual beliefs as to when to start pricing at a collusive level.
There is nothing to make period 1 a focal point as that is just where the analysis begins. It
is then an open question whether reasonable assumptions on mutual beliefs can be made to
result in rms pricing at ep.
17It is argued in Appendix B that, in the event of a departure from the price matching plus property. the
competitive outcome is salient in the sense of Lewis (1969) and Cubitt and Sugden (2003).
18Specically, p must be at least as high as p.
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4 Mutual Beliefs of PriceMatching Constrains the Col-
lusive Price
4.1 Derivation of an Upper Bound on Price
The rst step in the analysis is to show that A1 is internally consistent so that if a rm
believes its rivals use PMP-compatible strategies then it is optimal for that rm to use a
PMP-compatible strategy. This is Lemma 2. Theorem 3 provides an upper bound on price,
while Theorem 4 shows that this upper bound is strictly below a benchmark equilibrium
price.
Lemma 2 shows that if a rm believes other rms use PMP-compatible strategies then
it is optimal for that rm to also use a PMP-compatible strategy. In other words, the set
SPMP is closed under the best reply operator.
Lemma 2 If a rms beliefs are PMP-consistent then sequential rationality implies that the
rms strategy lies in SPMP .
Theorem 3 shows that if there is common knowledge that rms are sequentially rational
and use strategies satisfying the PMP property then price is bounded above by (approxi-
mately) p.
Theorem 3 If A1-A2 hold then f(pt1; :::; ptn)g1t=1 is weakly increasing over time and there
exists nite T such that pt1 =    = ptn = bp 8t  T where bp  p + ".
In explaining the basis for Theorem 3, rst note that while A1 leaves unspecied whether
some rm will initiate a price increase, it is fully consistent with A1 for a rm to be a price
leader. For example, if a rm believed other rms would not raise price then it would be
rational for it to increase price (as long as the current price is not too high). The issue is
how far would it go in raising price. If the rm expected that its price increase would only
be met and never exceeded by a rival (for example, rivals are believed to only match price
increases) then it would not want to raise price above (approximately) p.19 Recall that p
is the price at which a rm, if it were to raise price from p to any higher level (call it p0), it
would lose more in current prot (because of lower demand from pricing above the level p
set by its rivals) than it would gain in future prot (from all other rms raising price to p0).
Thus, a rm that believed its rivals would never initiate price increases would not raise price
beyond p. However, a rm might be willing to lead a price increase above p if it believed
it would induce a rival to further increase price; for example, if the rm believed that rms
would take turns leading price increases. Theorem 3 shows that cannot happen.
By A1 and Lemma 1, a rm will never price above ep. If ep > p then it furthermore
means that a rm would never raise price to ep since such a price increase would only induce
its rivals to match that price; it would not induce them to further raise price. Thus, if
a rm is sequentially rational and believes the other rms use PMP-compatible strategies
19In discussing results, I will generally refer to the upper bound as p rather than p+" since " is presumed
to be small.
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then it will not raise price to ep. This puts an upper bound on price of ep   ". We next
build on that result to argue that ep   2" is an upper bound on price. Given mutual beliefs
regarding sequential rationality and PMP-consistent beliefs, rm i then believes rm j ( 6= i)
is sequentially rational and that rm j believes rm h uses a PMP-compatible strategy (for
all h 6= j); hence, rm i knows that rm j will not raise price to ep. This means that rm i
knows that if it raises price to ep   " that this price increase will only be matched and not
exceeded, which then makes a price increase to ep   " unprotable (as long as ep   " > p).
Given that all rms are not willing to raise price to ep  " then ep  2" is an upper bound on
price. The proof is completed by induction to end up with the conclusion that a rm would
never raise price to a level exceeding p. Hence, price is bounded above by p.
In deriving this upper bound, the punishment for deviation from (at least) matching price
is reversion to a stage game Nash equilibrium. If rms had mutual beliefs regarding a grim
trigger strategy (so that the punishment is the same as in a PMP-compatible strategy), rms
could sustain a price as high as ep. With the more limited mutual beliefs that the strategy
prole lies in SPMP , price can only rise as high as p which the next result shows is strictly
less than ep:
Theorem 4 p 2  pN ; ep :
Recall that p is the price at which the reduction in current prot from a marginal
increase in a rms price is exactly equal in magnitude to the rise in the present value of the
future prot stream when that higher price is matched by all rms for the innite future.
Equivalently, p is the price at which the increase in current prot from a marginal decrease
in price to p   " is exactly equal in magnitude to the fall in the present value of the future
prot stream when the rms rivals lower price to p   " (when " is small). In comparison,ep is the price for a rm at which the increase in current prot from a marginal decrease in
price is exactly equal in magnitude to the fall in the present value of the future prot stream
when the rms rivals lower price to pN :20 Given that the punishment is more severe in the
latter case, it follows that the maximal sustainable price is higher: ep > p:
With common knowledge that the strategy prole lies in SPMP , the steady-state price
is bounded above by p even though higher prices are sustainable. In other words, if rms
started at a price of ep then such a price would persist under A1-A2. But if rms start with
prices below p, such as at the non-collusive price pN , then prices will not go beyond p,
even though higher prices are sustainable. The obstacle is that it is not in the interests of
any rm to lead a price increase beyond p. Thus, with only mutual understanding that the
strategy prole lies in SPMP , what is constraining how high price can go is the trade-o¤a rm
faces when it acts as a price leader: It foregoes current demand and prot in exchange for
higher future prot from its rivals having raised their prices to match its price increase. This
is to be contrasted with equilibrium where what limits how high is price is the condition
that a rm nds it unprotable to undercut it. In a sense, coordination comes for free
with equilibrium. Limited mutual understanding makes the coordination on price (through
price leadership) the constraining factor, not the stability of the price which is eventually
20That is, ep is the highest price for which a rm incentive compatibility constraint (1), holds. For this
discussion, suppose ep < pM .
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coordinated upon. Finally, note that Theorems 3 and 4 are robust to the form of the
punishment. p is independent of the punishment and, given another punishment, ep would
just be the highest sustainable price with that punishment. In particular, if the punishment
is at least as severe as the grim punishment then Theorems 3 and 4 are unchanged.21
In concluding, let me discuss the role of the niteness of the price set. p is the highest
price to which a rm will raise price if it can only anticipate that other rms will match its
price. Thus, a rm is willing to take the lead and price above p only if, by doing so, it
induces a rival to enact further price increases. Since no rm will price above ep then raising
price to ep cannot induce rivals to lead future price increases. Thus, a rm will not raise
price to a level beyond ep  "; which means ep  " is an upper bound on price. This argument
works iteratively to ultimately conclude that p is (approximately) an upper bound on price.
The niteness of price is critical in this proof strategy for it allows ep  " to be well-dened.
However, even with an innite price set, it is still the case that a necessary condition for
a rm to lead and raise price above p is that it will induce a rival to enact further price
increases. As that must always be true then, if the limit price were to exceed p when
there is an innite price set, prices cannot converge in nite time. But since it is still the
case that ep is an upper bound on price, the price increases must then get arbitrarily small;
eventually, each successive price increase will bring forth a smaller future price increase by
a rival. I am not arguing that this argument will prevent Theorem 3 from extending to the
innite price set but rather that it is the only argument that could possibly do so. Therefore,
either Theorem 3 extends to when the price set is innite or, if it does not, it implies a not
very credible price path with never-ending price increases that eventually become arbitrarily
small. The oddity of such a price path is an artifact of assuming an innite set of prices
when, in fact, the set of prices is nite.
4.2 Price Can Be Competitive or Supracompetitive
By Theorem 3, if rms have the common knowledge in A1 that rms are sequentially rational
and that their strategies satisfy the PMP property then price is bounded above by p. But is
p the least upper bound? And is there a lower bound on price exceeding pN? The purpose
of the current section is to show, by way of example, that it is consistent with A1-A2 for
price to converge to p but also to fail to rise above pN : Thus, a tighter result than Theorem
3 will require additional assumptions, which is a matter taken up in Section 5.
For the duopoly case, suppose the price set is composed of just three elements,

pN ; p0; pM
	
;
and p0   pM + pN =2: Assume  is su¢ ciently close to one so that p = ep = pM :22 Consider
21The property that price falls short of the equilibrium price is similar to a nding in Lockwood and
Thomas (2002). They consider a multi-player innite horizon setting in which actions are irreversible; that
is, the minimum element of player is period t action set is the action the player selected in period t   1.
The equilibrium path is uniformly bounded above by the rst-best for basically the same reasons that price
converges to a value less than ep. I want to thank Thomas Mariotti for pointing out this connection.
22In this example, as opposed to elsewhere in the paper, p is dened for when the feasible price set is
pN ; p0; pM
	
rather than <+. This, however, is a good approximation when  ' 1 as then p ' pM when
the price set is <+. Of course, if  ' 1 then ep = pM whether the price set is pN ; p0; pM	 or <+.
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the following pair of functions which map from max

pt 11 ; p
t 1
2
	
to current price pti:
SL
 
pN

= p0; SL (p0) = pM ; SL
 
pM

= pM (5)
SF
 
pN

= pN ; SF (p0) = p0; SF
 
pM

= pM
SL (where L denotes "leader") has a rm raise price to p0 when the lagged maximum price is
pN , to pM when the lagged maximum price is p0; and to price at pM when the lagged maximum
price is pM . SF (where F denotes "follower") has a rms price equal the lagged maximum
price. When SL (or SF ) is referred to as a strategy, it is meant that the specication in (5)
applies when both rms have priced at least as high as the previous periods maximum price
in all past periods, and otherwise a rm prices at pN . Thus, these strategies satisfy the PMP
property. It is shown in Appendix C that
 
SL; SF

is a subgame perfect equilibrium when
 ' 1 and

 
p0; pN

+ 
 
pM ; p0

> 
 
pM ; pN

+ 
 
pM ; pM

: (6)
(6) holds for the case of linear demand and linear cost when products are su¢ ciently di¤er-
entiated and/or cost is su¢ ciently low.
Given
 
SL; SF

is a subgame perfect equilibrium, it is easy to argue that both strategies
satisfy A1-A2. If, for all histories, a rms beliefs assign probability one to its rival using
strategy SF then SL is sequentially rational for those beliefs; and if a rms beliefs assign
probability one to its rival using strategy SL then SF is sequentially rational for those beliefs.
Therefore, SL and SF are consistent with A0: Mutual strong belief in A0 implies that rms
beliefs have support over strategies consistent with A0. Hence, SL and SF are consistent
with A1; and so forth.
Any price path consistent with rms deploying a strategy pair from

SL; SF
	2
is then
consistent with A1-A2. For example, a price path of
  
p0; pN

;
 
pM ; p0
  
pM ; pM

; :::

, with
a steady-state supracompetitive price of pM , is consistent with A1-A2. It is achieved by rm
1 using SL based on the belief that rm 2 use SF , and rm 2 using SF based upon the
belief that rm 1 uses SL. However, it is also the case that a price path of
  
pN ; pN

; :::

is consistent with A1-A2. It occurs when each rms strategy is SF which is sequentially
rational if, for all histories, it believes the other rm uses SL. Thus, common knowledge
of sequential rationality and that prices increases will be at least matched does not imply
supracompetitive prices; either competitive or supracompetitive prices could ensue.
5 Rational Learning and Price Matching Results in
Supracompetitive Prices
5.1 Derivation of the Long-Run Supracompetitive Price
Thus far, assumptions have been made on a rms beliefs regarding price matching - specif-
ically, other rms will at least match price up to a maximum level of ep - and regarding
what happens when behavior is contrary to such price matching - rms revert to competi-
tive prices. Common knowledge of those properties along with rationality - as expressed in
A1 - is su¢ cient to place an upper bound on price of (approximately) p. What is not yet
clear is whether price is assured of reaching p or whether price is mired at the competitive
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level. Though rms have mutual understanding about price matching, they lack mutual
understanding about who will lead on price and some rm must take the the lead if prices
are to rise above the competitive level. In some markets, a particular rm may be the salient
leader by virtue of its size or access to information (what is referred to as barometric price
leadership; see, for example, Cooper, 1997), but no such presumption is made here. Fur-
thermore, rms prefer to be price followers than price leaders because it is costly to initiate
a price hike as a rm will lose demand prior to its price being matched.23 Hence, each rm
would prefer another rm to take the lead in raising price which provides an incentive for a
rm to hesitate before leading. In this section, su¢ cient conditions are provided for one of
the rms to eventually lead and, therefore, collusion to succeed.
As described in Section 4.2, competitive pricing can occur - in spite of price matching
being common knowledge - because rmsbeliefs are inconsistent; each believes someone else
will lead on price and each takes the role of follower with no price leader emerging. However,
if rms could learn over time about rivalsstrategies then perhaps a rm would learn that
other rms are not likely to lead which would could induce it to raise price. This is the
avenue pursued here and, in doing so, I will draw on a result of Kalai and Lehrer (1993)
regarding the learning of strategies in an innitely repeated game.
To lay the background for this analysis, it is useful to provide an alternative description
of A1 by presenting it as restrictions on a rms prior beliefs on other rmsstrategies and
on their posterior beliefs conditional on the observed history. Dene B (X) to be the set
of strategies that are sequentially rational for some beliefs over other rmsstrategies with
support Xn 1: Dening X1 = B
 
SPMP

; X1 is the set of strategies that are sequentially
rational for some PMP-consistent beliefs. By Lemma 2, X1  SPMP . By A1, each rm
believes other rms use a strategy in X1: By A2, each rm believes other rms believe other
rms use a strategy in X1 which, along with the belief that other rms are sequentially
rational, means that each rm believes other rms use a strategy inX2 = B (X1). Continuing
in this manner, the innite hierarchy of beliefs implies that each rm believes other rms use
a strategy in X1 where X1 = B (X1) : Thus, A1 requires that a rm has beliefs over other
rmsstrategies with support X1, and chooses a strategy (necessarily from X1) that is
sequentially rational given those beliefs. Focusing on the restrictions placed on prior beliefs
and belief revision (in response to the history), A1 requires that prior beliefs on other rms
strategies have support (X1)n 1, while the only restriction on belief revision is that posterior
beliefs have support (X1)n 1.
To use the result of Kalai and Lehrer (1993), more structure needs to be placed on prior
beliefs and the belief revision process. Firms start with prior beliefs on the actual strategy
prole and from these beliefs are generated beliefs on innite price paths, 
1. The rst
23Wang (2009) provides indirect evidence of the costliness of price leadership. In a retail gasoline market
in Perth, Australia, Shell was the price leader over 85% of the time until a new law increased the cost of price
leadership, after which the three large rms - BP, Caltex, and Shell - much more evenly shared the role of
price leader. The law specied that every gasoline station was to notify the government by 2pm of its next
days retail prices, and to post prices on its price board at the start of the next day for a duration of at least
24 hours. Hence, a rm which led in price could not expect its rivals to match its price until the subsequent
day. The di¤erence between price being matched in an hour and in a day is actually quite signicant given
the high elasticity of rm demand in the retail gasoline market. For the Quebec City gasoline market, Clark
and Houde (2011, p. 20) nd that "a station that posts a price more than 2 cents above the minimum price
in the city loses between 35% and 50% of its daily volume."
16
restriction is that these prior beliefs do not assign zero probability to the actual price path
that is played. A3 is referred to as the "Grain of Truth" assumption.24
Assumption A3: Each rms prior beliefs on innite price paths assigns positive probabil-
ity to the true price path.
Though A3 only requires positive probability on the true price path, it is well-recognized
not to be a weak assumption because there is an innite number of price paths. However,
the more relevant point is that it is a far weaker assumption than the standard assumption
implicit in equilibrium which is that a rms beliefs put probability one on the true strategy
prole and thus the true price path. It is also worth noting that A3 is weaker than assuming
positive probability is assigned to the true strategy prole since there may be many strategy
proles that produce the same realized price path.
Thus far, minimal structure has been placed on how, in response to observed play, rms
revise their beliefs as to other rmsstrategies. Now, it is assumed that rms are Bayesian
learners.
Assumption A4: In response to the realized price path, a rm updates its beliefs as to
other rmsstrategies (and, therefore, the future price path) using Bayes Rule.
What transpires is that a rm starts with prior beliefs about the strategy prole and
the price path. By A1, these prior beliefs have support on those strategies consistent with
mutual understanding that each rm is sequentially rational and believes other rms use
PMP-compatible strategies and, by A3, assign positive probability to the set of strategy
proles that produce what will prove to be the observed price path. Given the strategy
prole that rms adopted given their prior beliefs, prices will be chosen and an outcome
path will emerge. Come period t; rms will have observed the rst t   1 periods of the
true underlying price path and each will update its beliefs as to other rmsstrategies and
the resultant future price path using Bayes Rule. By sequential rationality, it is required
that each rms strategy is optimal at that point. By the result of Kalai and Lehrer (1993),
this process will entail rms eventually having beliefs over the future path of play that
are "close" to the true future path of play. Theorem 5 shows that an implication of this
learning of the future price path is that rms are almost sure to eventually price close to the
supracompetitive price p.
Theorem 5 Assume A1-A4. For all  > 0, there exists T such that, with probability of at
least 1  ; pt1 =    = ptn = bp 8t  T where bp 2 fp   "; p; p + "g :
Learning implies supracompetitive prices will eventually emerge even though rms only
have mutual understanding over price matching and not over who will lead. To understand
why prices must converge to (approximately) p; suppose they did not and instead converged
24While Kalai and Lehrer (1993) allow for strategies in which players randomize, I am assuming that the
true strategy prole is a pure strategy prole. However, given that their analysis models a players beliefs
on other playersstrategies as a point belief, it is important for their analysis that beliefs are over mixed
(behavior) strategies. That is not the case with our analysis.
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to bp where bp < p  ". By the result of Kalai and Lehrer (1993), rms will eventually believe
with high probability that the future path has all rms price at bp. But since bp < p   "
then  (bp; :::; bp) > bp in which case a rm would nd it optimal to raise above bp given it
expects other rms to respond by at least matching that price increase.25 In other words,
if a rm eventually came to believe that the other rms were extremely unlikely to raise
price and the current price is less than p   "; then a rm would nd it protable to act
as a price leader. Thus, learning the future price path prevents rms from getting mired in
a miscoordination in which all rms do not act as a price leader because each anticipates
that other rms will do so. While such was possible when rmsprior and posterior beliefs
are only required to have support X1, it is ruled out (eventually) when prior beliefs do not
assign zero probability to the true price path and rms update their beliefs on other rms
strategies using Bayes Rule.
In concluding, let me make two remarks. First, A3-A4 are not su¢ cient to deliver
supracompetitive prices, even if rms use collusive strategies. Kalai and Lehrer (1993) prove
that A3-A4 (and each player knows its payo¤ function) is su¢ cient for play to converge
to equilibrium play. Suppose, for example, that rms are using the collusive strategies
described at the end of Section 3. Unless t1 =    = tn so that all rms know to start setting
the collusive price at the same time, the long-run price is the static Nash equilibrium price
pN . Though rms use collusive strategies and eventually learn the future price path, they
are in the punishment phase by the time that path is learned. Hence, supracompetitive
outcomes do not occur. Second, this analysis shows how the result of Kalai and Lehrer
(1993) can deliver more precise results when used in conjunction with some prior beliefs on
the strategy prole.
5.2 Example of a Supracompetitive Price Path
As illustrative of Theorem 5, strategies satisfying A1-A4 will be constructed. To keep the
analysis manageable, assume the price set has just two elements

pN ; pM
	
where pN is the
static Nash equilibrium price and pM is the monopoly price where pN < pM . Firms are
initially pricing at pN . The associated prot levels are denoted:
Own rms price Rival rms price Own rms prot
pN pN N
pN pM F
pM pN L
pM pM M
F > M > N > L so that prot is highest when the other rm raises price and a rm
keeps price low (and thus the latter acts as a follower, which is why its prot is referred to
as F ), and prot is lowest when the other rm keeps price low and a rm raises price (and
thus the latter acts as a leader, which is why its prot is referred to as L). Assume pM = p
25Recall that  is a rms optimal period t price when it expects other rms to price in period t at the
maximum price of period t  1 and all future prices equal the maximum price of period t. That is, all other
rms do not take the lead on raising price and only match price increases, and there will be no further price
increases after the current period.
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which means that a rms payo¤ from raising price from pN to pM , given the other rm is
expected to price at pN in the current period and match pM thereafter, exceeds that from
both rms pricing at pN forever:
L +


1  

M >
N
1   )  >
N   L
M   L : (7)
Our attention will focus on a natural class of PMP-compatible strategies which are dened
by T 2 f1; 2; :::g [ f1g where T is the earliest period in which a rm will lead. More
specically, a T -strategy has a rm lead and raise price to pM in period t when no rm
raised price prior to period t and t  T . T = 1 represents the strategy in which a rm
never takes the lead in raising price. In constructing beliefs that satisfy A1, I will focus on
prior beliefs for rm i that have full support on Tj 2 f1; 2; :::g [ f1g and obey Bayes Rule
so that A4 is satised.
Let us rst show that, with the assumption of full support, T = 1 is not sequentially
rational. Firm 1s prior probability on T2 2 fT 0; T 0 + 1; :::g necessarily goes to zero as
T 0 !1: Given that the probability of T2 =1 is positive, Bayesian updating implies that if
rm 2 has not raised price come period t then the posterior probability that rm 1 assigns to
T2 =1 goes to one as t!1: Hence, as t!1; the expected payo¤ from leading on price
converges to the LHS of (7) and the expected payo¤ from T1 = 1 converges to the RHS
of (7). Eventually, rm 1 will then prefer to lead on price which contradicts the sequential
rationality of T1 = 1. Hence, if rm 1 assigns positive prior probability to T2 = 1 then
Bayes Rule implies T1 =1 is not sequentially rational.
The next step is to show that there exists beliefs such that each strategy T 2 f1; 2; :::g is
sequentially rational, and that this set of strategies satises A1-A4. The prior beliefs of rm
i are assumed to have full support on Tj 2 f1; 2; :::g but, in order to simplify the analysis,
zero probability will be assigned to Tj = 1: (It can be shown that the ensuing analysis is
robust to allowing for a small positive probability attached to Tj =1.) For each strategy in
f1; 2; :::g ; prior beliefs on f1; 2; :::g are found such that the strategy is sequentially rational.
Given that all elements of f1; 2; :::g then satisfy A0 using beliefs with support f1; 2; :::g, all of
those strategies satisfy A1 as well and so forth; hence, f1; 2; :::g satises A1. As these beliefs
will be constructed to comply with Bayes Rule, A4 is also satised. Finally, A3 is satised
given each rm uses a strategy from f1; 2; :::g, prior beliefs have full support on f1; 2; :::g ;
and posterior beliefs satisfy Bayes Rule.
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To begin, consider the following prior beliefs of rm i on rm js strategy:
Tj Prior Probability
1 1=2
2 (1=2)2
...
...
t0j   1 (1=2)t
0
j 1
t0j (1=2)
t0j (1=x)
...
...
t0j + x  1 (1=2)t
0
j (1=x)
t0j + x (1=2)
t0j+1 (1=x)
...
...
t0j + 2x  1 (1=2)t
0
j+1 (1=x)
...
...
(8)
where t0j 2 f1; 2; :::g. For Tj 2

1; :::; t0j   1
	
, the probability assigned to the rival rm
using a strategy that has it lead in period Tj is (1=2)Tj and thus is exponentially declining.
Starting with period t0j, the probability assigned over every x periods exponentially decays
and that probability mass is uniformly distributed within a window of x periods. For Tj 2
t0j; :::; t
0
j + x  1
	
; the probability that the rival rms strategy has it lead in period t is
(1=2)t
0
j (1=x); and, more generally, for Tj 2

t0j + !x; :::; t
0
j + (1 + !)x  1
	
, the probability
that the rival rms strategy has it lead in period t is (1=2)t
0
j+! (1=x), ! 2 f0; 1; 2; :::g.
Let T1 represent the strategy of rm 1 and assume rm 1s prior beliefs on rm 2s
strategy are as specied in (8). The proof will rst derive su¢ cient conditions for it to be
sequentially rational for rm 1 to wait in period t (assuming neither rm has yet raised
price) when t < t02; in other words, sequential rationality requires T1  t02. Next, su¢ cient
conditions are derived for it to be sequentially rational for rm 1 to raise price when t = t02.
Finally, it is shown that if t > t02 then it is sequentially rational for rm 1 to raise price.
Thus, sequential rationality implies T1 = t02. As this will be shown for an arbitrary t
0
2 then
every strategy in f1; 2; :::g is sequentially rational for some prior beliefs.
Suppose rm 1s prior beliefs on rm 2s strategy are as specied in (8) and t02 > 1:
(The case of t02 = 1 is covered when I examine t = t
0
2.) Consider a strategy for rm 1 with
T1 > 1 so that rm 1 does not raise price in period 1. According to (8) with t02 > 1, rm 1
assigns probability 1/2 to T2 = 1 and, in that event, rm 2 raises price in period 1 so rm
1s payo¤ is F +
 

1 

M . Also with probability 1/2, rm 1 believes T2 > 1 in which case
rm 1s period 1 prot from T1 > 1 is N , while a lower bound on its expected future payo¤
is N= (1  ) (which rm 1 can achieve by pricing at pN in all ensuing periods). Thus, a
lower bound on rm 1s expected payo¤ from T1 > 1 is
1
2

F +


1  

M

+

1
2

1
1  

N : (9)
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In comparison, rm 1s expected payo¤ from T1 = 1 is
1
2

L +

1
2

M

+


1  

M : (10)
Hence, if t02 > 1 then it is sequentially rational for rm 1 not to raise price in period 1 when
(9) exceeds (10):
1
2

F +


1  

M

+

1
2

1
1  

N >

1
2

L +

1
2

M +


1  

M )
1 

M   N
F   L

> : (11)
Given the beliefs in (8) with t02 > 1, if (11) holds then T1 = 1 is not sequentially rational for
rm 1.
Now suppose it is period 2 and neither rm raised price in period 1. Firm 1 then infers
that T2  2. If prior beliefs are (8) with t02 > 2, Bayes Rule implies rm 1s posterior beliefs
are those in (8) divided by the probability that T2  2 (which is 1/2). By the same analysis
which showed that it is not sequentially rational for rm 1 to raise price in period 1 when
t02 > 1, it is not sequentially rational for rm 1 to raise price in period 2 when t
0
2 > 2. That
this property also holds for period 2 is because the posterior probability that rm 2 raises
price in period 2, given it did not raise price in period 1, equals the prior probability that
rm 2 raises price in period 1. In fact, this property holds for all t < t02 so that, if neither
rm has raised price come period t, it is not sequentially rational for rm 1 to raise price in
period t. In sum, if (11) holds then it follow from prior beliefs (8), posterior beliefs satisfying
Bayes Rule, and sequential rationality that T1  t02:
Now suppose it is period t = t02 and neither rm raised price over periods 1; :::; t
0
2   1.
The posterior beliefs of rm 1 on rm 2s strategy are
Posterior Probability
Tj as of Period t0j
t0j (1=2) (1=x)
t0j + 1 (1=2) (1=x)
...
...
t0j + x  1 (1=2) (1=x)
t0j + x (1=2)
2 (1=x)
...
...
t0j + 2x  1 (1=2)2 (1=x)
t0j + 2x (1=2)
3 (1=x)
...
...
(12)
It is shown in Appendix D that if (7) holds then, when x is su¢ ciently large, rm 1 prefers
to lead at t than to wait until t+ 1 as long as t  t0j because the likelihood of rm 2 leading
in the near future is small.
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In sum, if
 2

N   L
M   L ; 1 

M   N
F   L

(13)
then, for x su¢ ciently large, the sequentially rational strategy for rm 1 is T1 = t02. Given
that this argument works for all t02 2 f1; 2; :::g, every T1 2 f1; 2; :::g is sequentially rational.
That the interval in (13) is non-empty follows from M > N and F > M . If the discount
factor is in this intermediate range then a rm is su¢ ciently patient that itll initially wait to
see whether its rival leads (which means waiting when t < t0j) but it is su¢ ciently impatient
that eventually itll take the lead (which means taking the lead when t  t0j).
Given that every (T1; T2) 2 f1; 2; :::g2 satises A1-A4, the path has one of the rms
raising price at min fT1; T2g and the other rm matching price in the subsequent period. For
example, suppose 1 < T1 < T2: Both rms initially attach enough probability to the other
rm leading su¢ ciently early that they dont lead themselves. However, as time progresses
and the other rm has not led, each rm eventually attaches substantial probability to the
other rm not leading in the near future. Firm 1 shifts enough probability to rm 2s strategy
not having it take the lead in the near future that, once period T1 is reached and no rm
has led, rm 1 takes the leads and raises prices to pM . Firm 2 matches that price increase
in the subsequent period.
6 Concluding Remarks
In his classic examination of imperfect competition, Chamberlain (1948) argued that collu-
sion would naturally emerge because each rm would recognize the incentive to maintain a
collusive price, rather than undercut its rivalsprices and bring forth retaliation. We now
know that it is a non-trivial matter for rms to coordinate on a collusive solution because
there are so many collusive equilibria. This multiplicity poses a challenge for rms to achieve
mutual understanding with respect to the collusive strategy prole, and this challenge is ex-
acerbated should rms avoid express communication. All of this naturally raises the question
of how much mutual understanding must rms have in order to e¤ectively collude.
To my knowledge, this paper is the rst to explore the relationship between mutual
understanding among rms and the coordination on supracompetitive outcomes. Assuming
that the game and rmsrationality is common knowledge, I investigated the implications of
common knowledge that price increases will be at least matched and failure to do so results
in a return to competition. It was shown there is an upper bound on price that is strictly
below what equilibrium sustains (given the same underlying punishment). However, this
level of mutual beliefs is not su¢ cient to ensure success in colluding as both competitive
and supracompetitive price paths could ensue. If, in addition, rms update their beliefs on
other rmsstrategies using Bayes Rule and their prior beliefs assign positive probability to
the true price path then supracompetitive prices will occur almost for sure. Thus, mutual
understanding that price increases will be matched - but not about who will lead on price,
at what time, and at what level - is su¢ cient for rms to e¤ectively collude.
In this paper, the focus was on price leadership as a collusive mechanism where rms
shared beliefs that price increases would be at least matched. It is worthwhile to consider
other collusive mechanisms - such as various market allocation schemes and bid rigging - and
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to investigate how much mutual understanding must rms have if supracompetitive outcomes
are to emerge. By identifying the relationship between rmsmutual understanding and their
ability to e¤ectively collude, such a research program will identify what types of mutual
beliefs ought to raise concerns to competition authorities. Having identied those mutual
beliefs that support collusion, communication practices likely to generate those mutual beliefs
are a target for prohibition. In this manner, economic theory can contribute to identifying
the boundaries of unlawful collusion.
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7 Appendices
7.1 Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. First note that if max

pt 11 ; :::; p
t 1
n
	
= p then, by A1, rm i believes
8j 6= i: i) rm j will price at p for the innite future (level 1 belief); and ii) rm j believes
that all other rms will price at p for the innite future (level 2 belief). If p =2 pN ; :::; ep	,
we will show that (i)-(ii) are inconsistent with rm i believing rm j is sequentially rational
(level 2 belief). Hence, p =2 pN ; :::; ep	 is inconsistent with A1.
Suppose p < pN and max

pt 11 ; :::; p
t 1
n
	
= p so that (i)-(ii) hold and, therefore, rm i
believes rm j will price at p for the innite future. Consider instead rm j pricing at the
static best reply function  (p; :::; p) (> p) : In that case, rm i believes rm j expects to earn
the payo¤ on the LHS of the inequality:
1
1  

 ( (p; :::; p) ; p; :::; p) >

1
1  

 (p; :::; p) :
On the RHS of the inequality is the expected payo¤ by pricing at p forever which is clearly
less and thus runs contrary to rm i believing rm j is sequentially rational.
Next suppose p > ep  > pN and maxpt 11 ; :::; pt 1n 	 = p so again (i)-(ii) hold. Consider
rm j pricing instead at  (p; :::; p) (< p) : Firm i believes rm j expects to earn the payo¤
on the LHS of the inequality:
 ( (p; :::; p) ; p; :::; p) +


1  

N >

1
1  

 (p; :::; p) ;
which again runs contrary to rm i believing rm j is sequentially rational.
In summing up, A1 implies p =2 
 pN ; :::; ep	. Furthermore, existence of p such that A1
is satised is immediate as p = pN trivially satises it. Therefore, A1 implies p 2 pN ; :::; ep	.
A useful property of other rms using PMP-compatible strategies is that a lower bound
on a rational rms period t continuation payo¤ is the payo¤ associated with all rms
pricing at min

max

pt 11 ; :::; p
t 1
n
	
; ep	 in all periods (Lemma 6). Intuitively, if the ri-
vals to rm i are using PMP-compatible strategies then they will price at least as high
as min

max

pt 11 ; :::; p
t 1
n
	
; ep	 in all ensuing periods, as long as rm i does not violate the
PMP property and induce a shift to pN . Hence, rm i can at least earn the prot from all
rms (including i) pricing at min

max

pt 11 ; :::; p
t 1
n
	
; ep	.
Lemma 6 Suppose rm i uses strategy bsi. If rm i is sequentially rational and has PMP-
consistent beliefs then its expected continuation payo¤, Ui (bsi; i (s  jh)) ; satises
Ui
 bsi; i   ht     minmaxpt 11 ; :::; pt 1n 	 ; ep	 ; :::;minmaxpt 11 ; :::; pt 1n 	 ; ep	
1   ;
for all ht such that
pj  min

max

p 11 ; :::; p
 1
n
	
; ep	 8j;8  t  1:
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Proof of Lemma 6. Consider rm i pricing at min

max

pt 11 ; :::; p
t 1
n
	
; ep	 in period
t and then, in all ensuing periods, matching the maximum price of the other rms in the
previous period:
pti = min

max

pt 11 ; :::; p
t 1
n
	
; ep	 ; pi = maxp 1 i 	 for  = t+ 1; :::
where
max

p 1 i
	  maxp 11 ; :::; p 1i 1 ; p 1i+1 ; :::; p 1n 	 :
Given this behavior for rm i; consider any price path f(p1; :::; pn)g1=t assigned positive
probability by rm i (recalling that its beliefs are PMP-consistent). These are price paths
in which rm i matches the maximum price of the other rms in the previous period and
the other rms at least match the maximum price in the previous period though not pricing
above p. Firm is payo¤ for any of those price paths is

 
pti;p
t
 i

+
1X
=t+1
 t
 
max

p 1 i
	
;p i

:
Since pti  max

pt 1 i
	
and max

p 1 i
	  pj 8j 6= i; 8  t + 1; it follows from rm is
prot being increasing in the other rmsprices that

 
pti;p
t
 i

+
1X
=t+1
 t
 
max

p 1 i
	
;p i

(14)
   pti; :::; pti+ 1X
=t+1
 t
 
max

p 1 i
	
; :::;max

p 1 i
	
:
Next note that pti  max

pt 1 i
	  ep  pM implies

 
max

pt 1 i
	
; :::;max

pt 1 i
	    pti; :::; pti :
Therefore, the RHS of (14) is at least

 
pti; :::; p
t
i

+
1X
=t+1
 t
 
pti; :::; p
t
i

=
 (pti; :::; p
t
i)
1  i ;
which means (14) implies

 
pti;p
t
 i

+
1X
=t+1
 t
 
max

p 1 i
	
;p i
   (pti; :::; pti)
1  i : (15)
We have then constructed a strategy for rm i that, for any price path assigned positive
probability, yields a payo¤ of at least the RHS of (15). It then follows from sequential
rationality that Ui (bsi; i ( jht )) must also exceed the RHS of (15). Given pti was set equal
to min

max

pt 11 ; :::; p
t 1
n
	
; ep	 ; the lemma is proved.
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose ht is such that
pj < min

max

p 11 ; :::; p
 1
n
	
; ep	 for some j and some   t  1:
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A PMP-compatible strategy for rm i has a rm price at pN in the current and all future
periods. Thus, if rm is beliefs are PMP-consistent (that is, they have support in SPMP )
then pricing at pN is clearly optimal as rm i believes all other rms will price at pN forever.
Hence, a PMP-compatible strategy is uniquely optimal for rm i for those histories.
For the remainder of the proof, consider ht such that
pj  min

max

p 11 ; :::; p
 1
n
	
; ep	 8j;8  t  1:
To prove this lemma, itll be shown that, for any strategy for rm i that is not in SPMP ;
there exists a strategy in SPMP which yields a strictly higher payo¤and, therefore, sequential
rationality implies the use of a PMP-compatible strategy. Thus, as long as a rm believes
the other rms are using PMP-compatible strategies then a PMP-compatible strategy is
optimal.
Given pj  min

max

p 11 ; :::; p
 1
n
	
; ep	 8j;8  t   1, rm is strategy can vio-
late the PMP property (and thus not lie in SPMP ) either by pricing above ep or below
max

pt 11 ; :::; p
t 1
n
	
. Let us begin by considering a PMP-incompatible strategy that has rm
i price at p0 > ep. When its rivals price at pt i; a PMP-compatible strategy that has rm i
price at ep is more protable than pricing at p0 i¤:

 ep;pt i+  1  

 (ep; :::; ep) >   p0;pt i+  1  

 (ep; :::; ep) ; (16)
where recall that the other rms will only follow price as high as ep: (16) holds i¤

 ep;pt i >   p0;pt i : (17)
Given that pt i  (ep; :::; ep) and pN < ep then   pt i   (ep; :::; ep) < ep. By the strict
concavity of  in a rms own price and that  
 
pt i

< ep < p0, (17) is true.
Next consider a PMP-incompatible strategy that has rm i price at p00 < max

pt 11 ; :::; p
t 1
n
	
:
Let us show that a PMP-compatible strategy that has rm i price at max

pt 11 ; :::; p
t 1
n
	
is more protable than pricing at p00 for any pt i 2

max

pt 11 ; :::; p
t 1
n
	
; epn 1; that is, for
any prices for the other rms assigned positive probability given PMP-consistent beliefs.26
A su¢ cient condition for the preceding claim to be true is:

 
max

pt 11 ; :::; p
t 1
n
	
;pt i

+


1  


 
max

pt i
	
; :::;max

pt i
	
(18)
> 
 
p00;pt i

+


1  

N ;
where the LHS of (18) is a lower bound on the payo¤ from pricing at max

pt 11 ; :::; p
t 1
n
	
and the RHS is the payo¤ from pricing at p00. In examining the LHS, note that pti =
max

pt 11 ; :::; p
t 1
n
	
and that the other rmsstrategies are PMP-compatible imply
max

pt1; :::; p
t
n
	
= max

pt i
	
:
26Actually, it is shown to be only weakly as protable when pt i = (ep; :::; ep) :
26
Using Lemma 6, 

1  


 
max

pt i
	
; :::;max

pt i
	
is a lower bound on the future payo¤, which gives us the LHS of (18). When
pt i =
 
max

pt 11 ; :::; p
t 1
n
	
; :::;max

pt 11 ; :::; p
t 1
n
	
; (19)
(18) is

 
max

pt 11 ; :::; p
t 1
n
	
; :::;max

pt 11 ; :::; p
t 1
n
	
(20)
+


1  


 
max

pt 11 ; :::; p
t 1
n
	
; :::;max

pt 11 ; :::; p
t 1
n
	
> 
 
p00;max

pt 11 ; :::; p
t 1
n
	
; :::;max

pt 11 ; :::; p
t 1
n
	
+


1  

N :
Note that max

pt 11 ; :::; p
t 1
n
	 2 pN ; :::; ep	 where maxpt 11 ; :::; pt 1n 	  pN follows from the
assumption that (p01; :::; p
0
n) =
 
pN ; :::; pN

. (20) is then true for all p00 < max

pt 11 ; :::; p
t 1
n
	
as it is the equilibrium condition for a grim trigger strategy with collusive pricemax

pt 11 ; :::; p
t 1
n
	
.27
Thus, (18) holds for (19).
To complete the proof, it will be shown that the LHS of (18) is increasing in pt i at a
faster rate than the RHS in which case (18) holds for all
pt i 
 
max

pt 11 ; :::; p
t 1
n
	
; :::;max

pt 11 ; :::; p
t 1
n
	
:
The derivative with respect to ptj, j 6= i; of the LHS of (18) is
@
 
max

pt 11 ; :::; p
t 1
n
	
;pt i

@pj
+


1  

@max

pt i
	
@pj
nX
k=1
@
 
max

pt i
	
; :::;max

pt i
	
@pk
;
(21)
and of the RHS of (18) is
@
 
p00;pt i

@pj
: (22)
(21) exceeds (22) because the second term in (21) is non-negative, given that pt i 
 
pM ; :::; pM

,
and the rst term of (21) exceeds (22) becausemax

pt 11 ; :::; p
t 1
n
	
> p00 and @
2
@pi@pj
> 0; j 6= i:
Proof of Theorem 3. Given each rm has PMP-consistent beliefs then, by Lemma 2,
sequential rationality implies each rms strategy is PMP-compatible. As rmsstrategies are
PMP-compatible, it immediately follows that each rms price is weakly increasing. Given a
nite price set and the boundedness and monotonicity of prices, prices converge in nite time.
Hence, there exists bp 2 pN ; :::; ep	 and nite T such that pt1 =    = ptn = bp for all t  T . We
then need to show that bp  p+ ". If p+ "  ep then, given that PMP-compatible strategies
27Recall that ep is the highest price consistent with the grim trigger strategy being an equilibrium. Note
that (20) holds with equality when max

pt 11 ; :::; p
t 1
n
	
= ep and p00 =  (ep; :::; ep) and otherwise is a strict
inequality.
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do not have rms pricing above ep, it is immediate that bp  p + ": For the remainder of the
proof, suppose p + " < ep.
Let me provide an overview of the proof. First it is shown that if a rm is sequentially
rational and has PMP-consistent beliefs then it will not price at ep. The reason is as follows.
A rm would nd it optimal to price above p + " only if it induced at least one of its rivals
to enact further price increases (and not just match the rms price); that is the dening
property of p. However, if a rm believes its rivals will not price above ep (which follows
from having PMP-consistent beliefs and A2) then it is not optimal for a rm to raise price
to ep because it can only expect its rivals to match a price of ep; not exceed it. This argument
works as well to show that each of the other rms will not raise price to ep: Hence, there is
an upper bound on price of ep   ". The proof is completed by induction using the mutual
beliefs in A1. If a rm believes its rivals will not price above p0 then it can be shown that a
rm will nd it optimal not to price above p0   ", as long as p0  p + 2" which implies that
an upper bound on price is p + ", which is the desired result.
Before executing that proof strategy, the following lemma will be needed. Recall that
 (p i) is the best reply correspondence for the following objective function:
W (pi;p i)   (pi;p i) +


1  

 (pi; :::; pi) :
Given its rivals price at p i in the current period, W (pi;p i) is rm is payo¤ from pricing
at pi if it believed that all rms would match that price in all ensuing periods. Dene

U
(p i) to be the maximal element of  (p i) : Lemma 7 shows that the objective function
is decreasing in pi for all pi > 
U
(p i) : This follows naturally from the strict concavity of
W (pi;p i) but requires some care to show given the price space is nite.
Lemma 7 If p00 > p0  U (p i) then
 (p0;p i) +


1  

 (p0; :::; p0) >  (p00;p i) +


1  

 (p00; :::; p00) :
Proof of Lemma 7. To begin, let us show that 
U
(p i) is non-decreasing in p i. By the
denition of 
U
(p i), we know that:
W


U  
p0 i

;p0 i

 W  pi;p0 i > 0; 8pi 2 A  np 2 
 : p > U  p0 io :
Since @
2W (pi;p i)
@pi@pj
= @
2(pi;p i)
@pi@pj
> 0 then pi > 
U  
p0 i

and p00 i  p0 i imply
W
 
pi;p
0
 i
 W  pi;p00 i  W U  p0 i ;p0 i W U  p0 i ;p00 i ; 8pi 2 A;
and, re-arranging, we have
W
 
U
 
p0 i

;p00 i
 W  pi;p00 i  W U  p0 i ;p0 i W  pi;p0 i ; 8pi 2 A:
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Therefore,
W


U  
p0 i

;p00 i

 W  pi;p00 i > 0; 8pi 2 A;
which, along with p00 i  p0 i and the strict concavity of W in own price, imply 
U  
p00 i
 

U  
p0 i

. Hence, 
U
(p i) is non-decreasing.
By (4), p0 > p + " implies 
U
(p0; :::; p0)  p0   ". Given U (p i) is non-decreasing in
p i, it follows:
if p i  (p0; :::; p0) and p0 > p + " then U (p i)  p0   ": (23)
From the strict concavity of W in own price, we have:
if p00 > p0  U (p i) then
 (p0;p i) +


1  

 (p0; :::; p0) >  (p00;p i) +


1  

 (p00; :::; p00) :

Let us rst show that if rm i has PMP-consistent beliefs then it strictly prefers a
price of ep   " to ep. Given PMP-consistent beliefs, rm is beliefs on pt i have support
max

pt 11 ; :::; p
t 1
n
	
; epn 1. For any pt i 2 maxpt 11 ; :::; pt 1n 	 ; ep	n 1 ; Lemma 6 implies
that a lower bound on its payo¤ from pti = ep  " is

 ep  ";pt i+  1  

 (ep  "; :::; ep  ") : (24)
For any prices for the other rms for period t that are assigned positive probability - pt i 2
max

pt 11 ; :::; p
t 1
n
	
; ep	n 1 - rm i attributes a payo¤ from pti = ep equal to

 ep;pt i+  1  

 (ep; :::; ep) : (25)
Given that ep > p + " then U  pt i  ep  " for all pt i  (ep; :::; ep) by (23). It then follows
from Lemma 7 that (24) strictly exceeds (25). Therefore, for any beliefs of rm i with
support

max

pt 11 ; :::; p
t 1
n
	
; ep	n 1 ; a price of ep   " is strictly preferred to ep. In sum, if
rm i is sequentially rational and has PMP-consistent beliefs then its price will not exceedep  ".
Given the level 2 beliefs in Assumption A1, rm i believes rm j ( 6= i) is sequentially
rational and that rm j has PMP-consistent beliefs for rm k; 8k 6= j. Hence, applying the
preceding argument to rm j, rm i believes rm j will not price above ep ". Firm is beliefs
on pt i then have support

max

pt 11 ; :::; p
t 1
n
	
; ep  "	n 1 : If ep   " > p + " then, by (23),

U  
pt i
  ep  2" 8pt i  (ep  "; :::; ep  ").28 By the same logic as above, a lower bound on
rm is payo¤ from pti = ep  2" is

 ep  2";pt i+  1  

 (ep  2"; :::; ep  2") ; (26)
28If instead ep  "  p+ " then, given that it has already been shown ep  " is an upper bound on the limit
price, it follows that p + " is an upper bound and were done.
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while its payo¤ from pti = ep  " is

 ep  ";pt i+  1  

 (ep  "; :::; ep  ") : (27)
With (27), we used the fact that rms will not price above ep  "; which was derived in the
rst step. Again using Lemma 7, it is concluded that (26) strictly exceeds (27). Therefore,
for any beliefs of rm i over pt i with support

max

pt 11 ; :::; p
t 1
n
	
; :::; ep  "	n 1 ; a price ofep  2" is strictly preferred to ep  ". It follows that if a rm is sequentially rational and has
PMP-consistent beliefs, and believes other rms are sequentially rational and have PMP-
consistent beliefs then its optimal price does not exceed ep   2". Hence, all rms will not
price above ep  2".
The proof is completed by induction. Suppose we have shown that rm i believes that
the other rms will not price above p0 so rm is beliefs on pt i have support
max

pt 11 ; :::; p
t 1
n
	
; :::; p0
	n 1
:
(That we can get to the point that a rm has those beliefs is because of the hierarchy of
beliefs in A1.) If p0 > p + " then 
U  
pt i
  p0   " for all pt i  (p0; :::; p0) : A lower bound
on rm is payo¤ from pti = p
0   " is

 
p0   ";pt i

+


1  

 (p0   "; :::; p0   ") ; (28)
while its payo¤ from pti = p
0 is

 
p0;pt i

+


1  

 (p0; :::; p0) ; (29)
since all rms have an upper bound of p0 on their prices. Using Lemma 7, it is concluded
that (28) strictly exceeds (29). Therefore, for any beliefs of rm i over pt i with support
max

pt 11 ; :::; p
t 1
n
	
; p0
	n 1
; a price of p0 " is strictly preferred to p0. It follows that rms
prices are bounded above by p0 ". The preceding argument is correct as long as p0 > p+";
therefore, price is bounded above by p + ".
Proof of Theorem 4. p is dened by
@W (p; :::; p)
@pi
=
@ (p; :::; p)
@pi
+


1  
 nX
j=1
@ (p; :::; p)
@pj
= 0
or
@ (p; :::; p)
@pi
+ 
nX
j 6=i
@ (p; :::; p)
@pj
= 0:
For all p  pM ;
@ (p; :::; p)
@pi
< 0 and
nX
j=1
@ (p; :::; p)
@pj
 0;
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which implies p < pM by the strict concavity of W in own price. To show p > pN , note
that  (p; :::; p) >  (p; :::; p) and  (p; :::; p)  p 8p  pN implies  (p; :::; p) > p 8p  pN :
Since  (p; :::; p) T p as p S p then p > pN : We have then shown p 2  pN ; pM :
If ep = pM then p 2  pN ; ep and we are done. From hereon, suppose ep < pM in which
case the incentive compatibility constraint (ICC) binds:
 (ep; :::; ep)
1   =  ( (ep; :::; ep) ; ep; :::; ep) +


1  


 
pN ; :::; pN

: (30)
As p 2  pN ; p implies  (p; :::; p) < p   (p; :::; p) then, by the strict concavity of W ,
W (p; :::; p) > W ( (p) ; p; :::; p) ;
which is equivalently expressed as
 (p; :::; p)
1   >  ( (p) ; p; :::; p) +


1  

 ( (p) ; :::;  (p)) : (31)
p > pN implies  (p; :::; p) 2  pN ; p : Next note  (p; :::; p) < p  p < pM implies
 (p; :::; p) < pM : It then follows from  (p; :::; p) 2  pN ; pM that  ( (p) ; :::;  (p)) >

 
pN ; :::; pN

. Using this property in (31), we have
 (p; :::; p)
1   >  ( (p) ; p; :::; p) +


1  


 
pN ; :::; pN

; 8p 2  pN ; p : (32)
Therefore, p 2  pN ; p is sustainable with the grim trigger strategy. Given (30) - where the
ICC binds for p = ep - and evaluating (32) at p = p - so the ICC does not bind - it follows
from (2) that ep > p:
Proof of Theorem 5. To draw on the result of Kalai and Lehrer (1993), I need to
introduce some notation and denitions. If s is a strategy prole and Q   is a collection
of innite price paths for the game then dene s (Q) to be the probability measure on Q
induced by s: By A1, a strategy prole is an element of (X1)n   SPMP n and, by Lemma
3, the price path converges in nite time.
Suppose, contrary to the statement of Theorem 5, the true strategy prole, denoted es; has
price converge to p0 < p ". It is then the case that there exists T 0 such that es (Qbp) = 1 for
all innite price paths Qbp with the property: pt1 =    = ptn = p0 8t  T 0. By Theorem 1 of
Kalai and Lehrer (1993), 9T () such that rm is beliefs on the innite price paths, denoted
i; have the property that es is -close to i for price paths starting at t; 8t  T ().29
Given that es (Qbp) = 1 8t  max fT 0; T ()g then i must assign probability of at least 1 
to the future price path having the property: pt1 =    = ptn = p0 8t  max fT 0; T ()g.30
29Denition 1 (Kalai and Lehrer, 1993): Let  > 0 and let  and e be two probability measures dened
on the same space.  is said to be -close to e if there is a measurable set Q satisfying: (i)  (Q) and e (Q)
are greater than 1  ; and (ii) for every measurable set X  Q: (1  ) e (X)   (X)  (1 + ) e (X) :
30I am only using property (i) in Denition 1 of Kalai and Lehrer (1993); see footnote 30
.
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Given these beliefs, let us evaluate optimal play for rm i: For t  max fT 0; T ()g, rm
is expected payo¤ from acting according to its strategy and pricing at p0 has an upper bound
of
(1  )

 (p0; :::; p0)
1  

+ 

 (p0; pm:::; pm) +


1  

 (pm; :::; pm)

: (33)
Probability 1   is assigned to the "true" future price path in which price is always p0, and
the remaining probability is assigned to all rivals raising price to pm in the current period
(in order to provide an upper bound on the payo¤). Now consider rm i deviating from its
strategy of pricing at p0 by pricing instead at  (p0; :::; p0). Firm is expected payo¤ has a
lower bound of
(1  )

 ( (p0; :::; p0) ; p0; :::; p0) +


1  

 ( (p0; :::; p0) ; :::;  (p0; :::; p0))

: (34)
Probability 1    is assigned to other rms pricing at p0 in the current period and only
matching rm is price of  (p0; :::; p0) thereafter, which is the worst case scenario given rm i
has PMP-consistent beliefs. A zero payo¤ is assigned to the remaining probability  to give
us a lower bound. We want to show that pricing at p0 is not optimal - and thus inconsistent
with sequential rationality - which is the case if (34) exceeds (33):
(1  )

 ( (p0; :::; p0) ; p0; :::; p0) +


1  

 ( (p0; :::; p0) ; :::;  (p0; :::; p0))

> (1  )

 (p0; :::; p0)
1  

+ 

 (p0; pm:::; pm) +


1  

 (pm; :::; pm)

or
(35)
(1  )

 ( (p0; :::; p0) ; p0; :::; p0) +


1  

 ( (p0; :::; p0) ; :::;  (p0; :::; p0))   (p
0; :::; p0)
1  

> 

 (p0; pm:::; pm) +


1  

 (pm; :::; pm)

:
Given that p0 < p   " then the rst bracketed term in (35) is strictly positive. Hence, for
 su¢ ciently small, (35) holds. Thus, if t is su¢ ciently great, rm is beliefs are such that
pricing at p0 in period t is non-optimal. Therefore, I conclude that price cannot converge to
a value below p   ": Given that Theorem 3 showed that an upper bound on convergence is
p + ", it is concluded that prices converges to some value in fp   "; p; p + "g.
7.2 Appendix B: Competitive Outcome is Salient After a Depar-
ture from Price Matching
Suppose a rm raises price and, in the subsequent period, some other rm fails to match
(or exceed) that price and thus violates the PMP property. In response to such an event,
rms share the belief that all rms will return to static Nash equilibrium prices; competition
replaces collusion. In specifying how rms respond to this incongruity between beliefs and
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behavior - they expected a price increase to be at least matched and it was not - let me
provide a justication by drawing on Lewis (1969) to argue that the competitive solution is
salient.
Lewis (1969) denes a salient outcome as "one that stands out from the rest by its
uniqueness in some conspicuous respect"31 and that precedence is one source of saliency:
"We may tend to repeat the action that succeeded before if we have no strong reason to do
otherwise."32 Cubitt and Sugden (2003) stress the latter qualier and note that "precedent
allows the individual to make inductive inferences in which she has some condence, but
which are overridden whenever deductive analysis points clearly in a di¤erent direction."33
With this perspective in mind, the movement from competition to collusion can be seen as a
shift from inductive to deductive reasoning. Firms have been competing and, by induction,
they would expect to continue to do so. However, through some other coordinating event,
rms supplant inductive inferences with deductive reasoning so that a common expectation
of competition is replaced with a common expectation of price matching. With this as a
backdrop, my claim is that a subsequent departure in behavior from price matching implies
a breakdown in the e¢ cacy of deductive reasoning, in response to which rms revert to the
original inductive analysis and therefore the competitive solution. Here I am appealing to
the view that rms will "tend to pick the salient as a last resort."34 The saliency of the
competitive solution emanates from it being the most recent outcome (prior to the current
episode of collusion) that was common knowledge to rms.
There are two implicit assumptions in the preceding argument that warrant discussion.
First, the saliency of the competitive solution relies on it prevailing prior to this episode
of tacit collusion. However, that is not essential. If some other behavior described the
pre-collusion setting then that behavior can be assumed instead. What is critical is that
how rms respond to the departure from price matching is common knowledge and the
associated continuation payo¤ is lower than if rms had abided by the PMP property. A
second assumption, which gures prominently in discussions of saliency (such as in Lewis,
1969), is that the current post-collusion situation is su¢ ciently similar to the pre-collusion
situation so that induction on the latter is compelling. It is well-recognized that35
no two interactions are exactly alike. Any two real-world interactions will
di¤er in matters of detail, quite apart from the inescapable fact that "previous"
and "current" interactions occur at di¤erent points in time. Thus, the idea of
"repeating what was done in previous instances of the game" is not well-dened.
Precedent has to depend on analogy: to follow precedent in the present instance
is to behave in a way that is analogous with behaviour in past instances. ...
Inductive inference is possible only because a very small subset of the set of
possible patterns is privileged.
The post-collusion scenario most notably di¤ers from the pre-collusion scenario in that the
former was preceded by an episode of collusion, while the latter was (probably) not. Though
31Lewis, (1969), p. 35.
32Lewis, (1969), p. 37.
33Cubitt and Sugden (2003), p. 196. Also see Sugden (2011).
34Lewis, (1969), p. 35.
35Cubitt and Sugden (2003), pp. 196-7.
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this di¤erence could disrupt the saliency of the pre-collusion outcome when it comes to
responding to a departure from the PMP property, it is reasonable for its saliency to remain
intact which is the presumption made here.
7.3 Appendix C:
 
SL; SF

is a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
In deriving su¢ cient conditions for
 
SL; SF

to be a subgame perfect equilibrium, let us rst
consider SL and have  denote the lagged maximum price. If  = pN then SL
 
pN

= p0
which is optimal i¤ p0 is at least as protable as pN ;

 
p0; pN

+ 
 
pM ; p0

+

2
1  


 
pM ; pM

(36)
   pN ; pN+   p0; pN+ 2  pM ; p0+  3
1  


 
pM ; pM

and at least as protable as pM ;

 
p0; pN

+ 
 
pM ; p0

+

2
1  


 
pM ; pM

(37)
   pM ; pN+  
1  


 
pM ; pM

:
(36) and (37) can be simplied to:

 
p0; pN

+ 
 
pM ; p0

+ 2
 
pM ; pM
    pN ; pN+   p0; pN+ 2  pM ; p0 (38)

 
p0; pN

+ 
 
pM ; p0
    pM ; pN+   pM ; pM (39)
If  ' 1 then (38) is true, and (39) is true when:

 
p0; pN

+ 
 
pM ; p0

> 
 
pM ; pN

+ 
 
pM ; pM

(40)
Now suppose  = p0: SL (p0) = pM is optimal i¤ pM is at least as protable as pN ;

 
pM ; p0

+


1  


 
pM ; pM
    pN ; p0+  
1  


 
pN ; pN

; (41)
and at least as protable as p0;

 
pM ; p0

+


1  


 
pM ; pM
   (p0; p0) +   pM ; p0 (42)
+

2
1  


 
pM ; pM

:
If  ' 1 then (41) and (42) hold. Finally, if  = pM then SL  pM = pM is optimal i¤:
1
1  


 
pM ; pM
  max  pN ; pM ;   p0; pM	+  
1  


 
pN ; pN

; (43)
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which holds if  ' 1: In sum, SL is subgame perfect if  ' 1 and (40) holds.
Next, let us turn to SF : If  = pN then SF
 
pN

= pN is optimal i¤ pN is at least as
protable as p0;

 
pN ; p0

+
 
p0; pM

+

2
1  


 
pM ; pM
   (p0; p0)+  p0; pM+ 2
1  


 
pM ; pM

;
(44)
and is at least as protable as pM ;

 
pN ; p0

+ 
 
p0; pM

+

2
1  


 
pM ; pM
    pM ; p0+  
1  


 
pM ; pM

: (45)
Both conditions hold for all .36 If  = p0 then SF (p0) = p0 is optimal i¤ p0 is at least as
protable as pN ;

 
p0; pM

+


1  


 
pM ; pM
    pN ; p0+  
1  


 
pN ; pN

; (46)
and is at least as protable as pM ;

 
p0; pM

+


1  


 
pM ; pM
   1
1  


 
pM ; pM

: (47)
(46) holds for  ' 1, and (47) holds for all : Finally, if  = pM then SF  pM = pM is
optimal i¤ (43) is true. In sum, SF is subgame perfect if  ' 1:
To evaluate when (40) holds, consider:

 
p0; pN

+ 
 
pM ; p0

> 
 
pM ; pN

+ 
 
pM ; pM
,


pM + pN
2
; pN

    pM ; pN >   pM ; pM  pM ; pM + pN
2

,
 
Z pM
pM+pN
2
 
@
 
p; pN

@p1
!
dp1 >
Z pM
pM+pN
2
 
@
 
pM ; p

@p2
!
dp2: (48)
Assuming linear demand and constant marginal cost,
 (pi;p i) =
 
a  bpi + d

1
n  1
X
j 6=i
pj
!
(pi   c) ;where a > bc > 0; b > d > 0;
(48) is
 
Z pM
pM+pN
2
 
a+ bc  2bp1 + dpN

dp1 >
Z pM
pM+pN
2
d
 
pM   c dp2 ,
   a+ bc+ dpNpM   pN
2

+ b
" 
pM
2   pM + pN
2
2#
> d
 
pM   cpM   pN
2

36Note that 
 
pN ; p0

>  (p0; p0) for if that was not the case then p0 would be a static Nash equilibrium
and thereby violation the assumption that pN is the unique Nash equilibrium. Similarly, it must be true
that 
 
p0; pM

> 
 
pM ; pM

:
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which, after some manipulations, is equivalent to
3bpM + bpN > 2a+ 2bc+ 2dpN + 2dpM   2dc: (49)
Substituting
pN =
a+ bc
2b  d; p
M =
a+ (b  d) c
2 (b  d)
and again performing some manipulations, (49) is equivalent to
[a+ (b  d) c] (6b  4d) (b  d) + d2+ 2 (b  2d) (b  d) dc > 0: (50)
The rst term is positive because b > d, while the second term is non-negative when b  2d.
Hence, if products are su¢ ciently di¤erentiated then (50) is true. When instead b < 2d then
(50) holds when c ' 0. Hence, if cost is su¢ ciently small then (50) is true
7.4 Appendix D: Completion of Proof Constructing Beliefs Con-
sistent with A1-A4
Suppose it is period t = t02 and neither rm raised price over periods 1; :::; t
0
2   1. The
posterior beliefs of rm 1 on rm 2s strategy are as specied in (12). As a rst step, let us
show that T1 = T 0 is preferable to T1 = T 0 + 1 for all T 0 2 ft02; :::; t02 + x  2g ; that is, it is
better to lead in period t than wait and lead in period t+ 1 for all t 2 ft02; :::; t02 + x  2g.
In comparing T 0 and T 0+ 1, rst note that they yield the same prot sequence if T2 < T 0
as then rm 2 raises price rst. Hence, we can focus on the payo¤s associated with when
T2  T 0. Next note that both strategies always yield the same prots prior to T 0 and the
same prot of M starting with period T 0+ 2, so we need only consider how expected prots
di¤er in periods T 0 and T 0 + 1. With probability (1=2) (1=x), rm 2s strategy is T 0 so it
raises price in period T 0 in which case the period T 0 prot to rm 1 from strategy T 0 is M
and from strategy T 0+1 is F ; both strategies yield the same prot starting in period T 0+1.
With probability (1=2) (1=x), rm 2s strategy is T 0+ 1 in which case the period T 0 prot to
rm 1 from strategy T 0 is L and from strategy T 0 + 1 is M ; both strategies yield the same
prot starting in period T 0 + 1. And with probability
1
2

x  1  (T 0 + 1  t02)
x

+
1X
y=2

1
2
y
rm 2s strategy exceeds T 0+ 1 in which case rm 1s payo¤ over periods T 0 and T 0+ 1 from
strategy T 0 is L + M and from strategy T 0 + 1 is N + L; and both strategies yield the
same prot starting in period T 0+ 2. Thus, the di¤erence between the expected payo¤ from
strategy T 0 and strategy T 0 + 1 is
1
2

1
x
 
M + M
   F + M (51)
+

1
2

1
x
 
L + M
   N + M
+
"
1
2

x  1  (T 0 + 1  t02)
x

+
1X
y=2

1
2
y#  
L + M
   N + L
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For x su¢ ciently large, the sign of this expression is the same as the sign of the third term.
Hence, (51) is positive if x is su¢ ciently large and
L + M > N + L: (52)
(52) is equivalent to
 >
N   L
M   L : (53)
In sum, if x is su¢ ciently large and (53) holds then rm 1 prefers strategy T 0 to strategy
T 0 + 1 for all T 0 2 ft02; :::; t02 + x  2g : Note that this condition is the same as (7).
Thus far, conditions have been derived whereby if t = t02 then rm 1 prefers to lead than
to wait and lead in any period in ft02 + 1; :::; t02 + x  2g. The next step is to show that rm 1
prefers to lead in period t02 (T1 = t
0
2) than to wait and lead in period t
0
2 +x (T1 = t
0
2 +x): Note
that, as of period t02, the posterior probability assigned by rm 1 to T2 = t
0
2 is (1=2) (1=x)
and to T2 = t02 + x is (1=2)
2 (1=x). The expected payo¤ from T1 = t02 is
1
2

1
x

M
1  

+

1 

1
2

1
x

L +
M
1  

: (54)
With probability (1=2) (1=x) ; rm 2 also raises price in period t02 so rm 1s current and
future prot is M :With probability 1  (1=2) (1=x) ; rm 2 does not raise price in period t02
so rm 1s current prot is L and its future prot stream is M : The expected payo¤ from
T1 = t
0
2 + x is
1
2

1
x

F +
M
1  

+

1
2

1
x

N + F +
2M
1  

+
  +

1
2

1
x

N + N +   + x 2N + x 1F + 
xM
1  

+

1
2
2
1
x

N + N +   + x 1N + 
xM
1  

+
"
1 

1
2

 

1
2
2
1
x
#
N + N +   + x 1N + xL + 
x+1M
1  

:
The rst term is the probability that T2 = t02 multiplied by the payo¤ in that event, the
second term is the probability that T2 = t02 + 1 multiplied by the payo¤ in that event, and
so forth; the penultimate term is the probability that T2 = t02 + x multiplied by the payo¤
in that event, and the nal term is the probability that T2 > t02 + x multiplied by the payo¤
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in that event. Collecting common prot terms,
1
2

1
x
 
1 +  +   + x 1 F (55)
+

1
2

1
x
 
1 +  +   + x 1 M
1  
+

1
2

1
x

1 + (1 + ) +   +  1 +  +   + x 2 N
+

1
4x

N + N +   + x 1N + 
xM
1  

+

2x  1
4x

N + N +   + x 1N + xL + 
x+1M
1  

In evaluating the third term, note that
1 + (1 + ) +   +  1 +  +   + x 2 (56)
=
x 1X
y=1

1  y
1  

=

1
1  
 x 1X
y=1
(1  y)
=

1
1  
 
(x  1) 
x 1X
y=1
y
!
=

1
1  

(x  1)  

1  x 1
1  

Substituting (56) and simplifying, (55) becomes
1
2

1
x

1  x
1  

F +

1
2

1
x

1  x
1  

M
1   (57)
+

1
2

1
x

1
1  

(x  1)  

1  x 1
1  

N
+

1
4x

1  x
1  

N +
xM
1  

+

2x  1
4x

1  x
1  

N + xL +
x+1M
1  

Using (54) and (57), the expected payo¤ from T1 = t02 exceeds that from T1 = t
0
2 + x when
1
2

1
x

M
1  

+

1 

1
2

1
x

L +
M
1  

(58)
>

1
2

1
x

1  x
1  

F +

1
2

1
x

1  x
1  

M
1  
+

1
2

1
x

1
1  

(x  1)  

1  x 1
1  

N
+

1
4x

1  x
1  

N +
xM
1  

+

2x  1
4x

1  x
1  

N + xL +
x+1M
1  

Letting x!1, (58) is
L +
M
1   >

1
1  

N ;
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which is equivalent to (53).
In summing up the previous two steps, if (53) holds then, for x su¢ ciently large, at
period t = t02 : 1) rm 1 prefers T1 = t
0
2 to T1 = t
0
2 + 1; prefers T1 = t
0
2 + 1 to T1 = t
0
2 + 2, ...,
prefers T1 = t02 + x  2 to T1 = t02 + x  1; and 2) rm 1 prefers T1 = t02 to T1 = t02 + x. By
the structure of prior (and posterior beliefs), the analysis is the same starting from period
t02 + x so that: 3) rm 1 prefers T1 = t
0
2 + x to T1 = t
0
2 + x + 1; prefers T1 = t
0
2 + x + 1 to
T1 = t
0
2 + x+ 2, ..., prefers T1 = t
0
2 + 2x  2 to T1 = t02 + 2x  1: By transitivity and (1)-(3),
rm 1 prefers T1 = t02 to T1 for all T1 2 ft02 + 1; :::; t02 + 2x  1g : Iterating, rm 1 prefers
T1 = t
0
2 to T1 for all T1 > t
0
2:
In sum, if (11) and (53) hold then, for x su¢ ciently large, the sequentially rational
strategy for rm 1 is T1 = t02. Given that this argument works for all t
0
2 2 f1; 2; :::g, every
T1 2 f1; 2; :::g is sequentially rational. Combining (11) and (53), it is required that
 2

N   L
M   L ; 1 

M   N
F   L

: (59)
Note that there exist values for the discount factor whereby this condition holds because
1 

M   N
F   L

>
N   L
M   L , 
M   L  F   L   M   L  M   N >  N   L  F   L, 
M   N  F   L >  M   N  M   L, F > M ;
which is true because M > N and F > M .
In concluding, let us explain why the analysis is robust to allowing rm is prior beliefs
assign a small positive probability to Tj = 1. Modify the prior beliefs in (8) so that
probability  2 (0; 1) is assigned to Tj =1 and the probabilities for all other Tj are scaled
by 1  . Prior beliefs are now:
Tj Prior Probability
1 
1 (1=2) (1  )
2 (1=2)2 (1  )
...
...
t0j   1 (1=2)t
0
j 1 (1  )
t0j (1=2)
t0j (1=x) (1  )
...
...
t0j + x  1 (1=2)t
0
j (1=x) (1  )
t0j + x (1=2)
t0j+1 (1=x) (1  )
...
...
t0j + 2x  1 (1=2)t
0
j+1 (1=x) (1  )
...
...
Now that there is some prior probability that rm j will never lead (Tj = 1), rm i will
have a stronger incentive to lead rather than wait. However, as long as  is small relative
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to 1=t0j - so that the posterior probability that Tj =1 is su¢ ciently small for t < t0j - then
rm i will continue to prefer to wait for all t < t0j. Thus, the sequential rationality of not
leading before t0j is robust to  > 0 and small. Turning to the analysis that proves it is
sequentially rational for rm i to lead for t  t0j, it is reinforced when  > 0. A rm will
be more inclined to lead when it assigns positive probability to the rival rm never leading.
While the associated analysis required that x is su¢ ciently large, note that x does not need
to be su¢ ciently large relative to 1=. For the proof to go through, we just need that  is
small relative to 1=t0j.
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